Fordham University
Masthead Logo
Senior Theses

DigitalResearch@Fordham
International Studies

Spring 5-19-2018

Miles Apart: A Comparative Case Study Analysis
of the Acculturation and Socioeconomic Status of
Former Colonized Populations in Post-Imperialist
States
Mariea Melanie Sekijima
Fordham University, msekijima@ofrdham.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://fordham.bepress.com/international_senior
Part of the International and Area Studies Commons
Recommended Citation
Sekijima, Mariea Melanie, "Miles Apart: A Comparative Case Study Analysis of the Acculturation and Socioeconomic Status of
Former Colonized Populations in Post-Imperialist States" (2018). Senior Theses. 11.
https://fordham.bepress.com/international_senior/11

This is brought to you for free and open access by the International Studies at DigitalResearch@Fordham. It has been accepted for inclusion in Senior
Theses by an authorized administrator of DigitalResearch@Fordham. For more information, please contact considine@fordham.edu.

Sekijima 1

Miles Apart: A comparative case study analysis of the acculturation
and socioeconomic status of former colonized populations in postimperialist states

Mariea Sekijima
msekijima@fordham.edu
B.A. International Studies, Global Track
Fordham University, Lincoln Center Class of 2018
Prof. Diane Detournay
INST 4000 L02
Thesis Advisor: Prof. Edward Bristow

Sekijima 2

Table of Contents
I.
II.
III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.
VIII.
IX.

Abstract
Introduction
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
a. Overview
b. Literature Review
i. Introduction
ii. Japanese Imperialism in Korea – Colonial Migration
iii. Japanese Imperialism in Korea – Post-decolonization Migration
iv. British Imperialism in India – Colonial Migration
v. British Imperialism in India – Post-decolonization Migration
c. Theoretical Framework
Methodology
a. Importance of Case Studies Chosen
b. Method
c. Limitations
Case Study – The Zainichi Korean Experience
a. Economic Prosperity
b. Social Acculturation
Case Study – The British Hindu Indian Experience
a. Economic Prosperity
b. Social Acculturation
Analysis
Conclusion
Works Cited

Sekijima 3

I.

Abstract

This undergraduate thesis assesses the impact of government policies and acculturation
strategies on the current socioeconomic status of former colonized populations living in their
respective post-imperialist states. Despite a shared colonial history, the current positioning of
Zainichi Koreans in Japan and British Hindu Indians in the UK is vastly different. I argue that
this can be linked to two factors—the government strategy in response to these populations and
the existence of other minorities within the same state. Using a case study approach to analyze
these contrasting experiences, this thesis contributes to a wider conversation on the continual
legacies of imperialism seventy years following the decolonization of both the Korean peninsula
and the Indian subcontinent.
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II.

Introduction
Due to the political, economic, and social destabilization and violence colonialism caused

on the Indian subcontinent and the Korean peninsula, substantial waves of voluntary and
involuntary migrants moved to their respective imperial counterparts both during and following
the period of colonization. Over seven decades later, these diaspora communities and their
subsequent generations are now amongst the largest ethnic minority populations living in their
former ruling states. Both the shared history of colonization and the substantial migrant patterns
of Hindu Indians to the United Kingdom and Koreans to Japan place the two populations in a
similar context. However, statistics and surveys suggest that despite this, the current experience
and socioeconomic status of British Hindu Indians and Zainichi Koreans differs greatly from one
another—the socioeconomic gap between British Hindu Indians and the white British majority is
much smaller than the one between Zainichi Koreans and the Japanese majority. Further, the
British Hindu Indian population has become more well-integrated within multicultural Britain
while there still remains a significant degree of ostracization of Zainichi Koreans in Japan.
Following the end of British rule over India and Japanese rule over Korea, these diaspora
populations became subject to wider post-colonial reconstruction efforts including the former
imperial governments’ attempts at solving the dilemma of a vast and growing influx of an ethnic
minority no longer under colonial rule. Thus, for these former colonized populations, the
question of whether to assimilate into the mainstream or maintain their ethnic-based cultures and
traditions took place within the power dynamics and systems put in place by the majority
government.
Seeking to better understand the circumstances which have influenced the current societal
status and economic circumstances of British Hindu Indians and Zainichi Koreans, I will analyze

Sekijima 5

the post-colonial government policies addressing these populations and the strength of
ethnocultural identification amongst these diaspora populations. Understanding that these factors
influence one another (and further, are not the only factors in play), this thesis does not seek to
frame this analysis as causational. Rather, through the use of the British Hindu Indian and
Zainichi Korean experiences as two contrasting case studies situated in a similar context, this
paper aims to help better understand the political and personal dynamics in conversation with
one another within a wider post-colonial structure and the evolution of such factors over time.

III.

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

Overview
This literature review seeks to provide the background information necessary to
understanding the context in which this thesis is situated within existing scholarship. Although
this thesis primarily focuses on the postcolonial era, it would be not only naïve, but also
dangerous to only look at events following decolonization, as the process of imperialism and
colonialism itself had, and continues to have, a lasting impact. The theoretical framework also
serves to define terms often used throughout this thesis, including the broadly used concepts of
acculturation and transnationalism.
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Literature Review
Introduction
It has been well over seven decades since the official end of the Japanese annexation of
Korea and British colonization of the Indian subcontinent. From the beginning of colonization,
throughout, and following decolonization, the migrant patterns of Koreans to Japan and Indians
to the UK have shifted in response to both government policy and individual autonomy. To
analyze these migrant populations and their current socioeconomic status as residents of their
former colonial ruling state, it is necessary to map out such patterns and gain an understanding of
the forces and restrictions which contributed to the experiences of Zainichi Koreans and British
Hindu Indians.
A. Japanese Imperialism in Korea – Colonial Migration
For a period of over two centuries, Japan was largely closed off economically, politically,
and socially from the rest of the world. When it reopened its borders in the 1860s, Japan was
faced with the reality of a world in which European countries were expanding—not only within
their own continent, but through the acquisition of Asian colonies as well. Placed within a
context of encroaching Western imperialism in East Asia, the Japanese government’s response
was to follow a similar policy through foreign expansion of their own into neighboring Taiwan,
Korea, and later, parts of Manchuria.
The Korean peninsula was officially annexed in 1910, as a strategically important
territory for influence between mainland China and Japan. With this territorial acquisition and a
labor shortage serving as an impetus in the 1920s, ethnic Koreans migrated in significant
numbers to Japan—expanding tenfold to 419,000 by 1930 and reaching over two million by the
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end of Japanese rule over Korea in 1945. 1 The majority of these Korean migrants filled labor
roles, particularly in the sectors of construction, coalmining, and later during the war, factory
work. 2 Wartime shortages also introduced the concept of enforced migration, conscripting
Koreans for both labor and military purposes. 3
While earlier migrant patterns are largely considered voluntary, the extent to which
migration was truly elected is contested within this colonial context. The colonization of Korea
by Japan created unfavorable conditions within their homeland including a weakened economy
and social and political suppression, leading many to seek better employment and educational
opportunities overseas. 4 Coupled with an intense labor demand and active government
recruitment, migrant Korean workers were strongly influenced by, and thus responded to, the
effects and conditions of Japanese imperial rule. As sociologist John Lie succinctly summarizes,
“Japanese imperialism and capitalism created and crafted the unwilling population who [then]
had to endure and struggle against racist Japanese society.” 5
These unequal policies included comparatively lower wages, poor working conditions
and the absence of strong union options, furthered by both a lack of literacy and education
severely limiting employment options and promoting racially-based employee policies. 6 Further,

1

Yondal Kim, Chosakushu, vol. 3, ed. Hida Yuichi (Tokyo, Japan: Akashi Shoten, 2003), quoted
in John Lie, Zainichi (Koreans in Japan), (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008),
4.
Toshiyuki Tamura, “The Status and Role of Ethnic Koreans in the Japanese Economy” in The
Korean Diaspora in the World Economy, ed. C. Fred Bergsten and In-bom Ch’oe (Peterson
Institute for International Economics, 2003), 80.
2
Lie, Zainichi (Koreans in Japan), 5.
3
Ibid.
4
Michael Weiner and David Chapman, “Zainichi Koreans in history and memory,” in Japan’s
Minorities, second edition, ed. Michael Weiner (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), 162.
5
Lie, Zainichi (Koreans in Japan), 4.
6
Weiner and Chapman, “Zainichi Koreans in history and memory,” 163.
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ethnic Koreans were often excluded from the wider housing market by both poverty and
discriminatory practices, leading to poor living conditions and subsequent outbreaks of infectious
disease. 7 Therefore, these migrant populations truly “formed the most exploited and least
protected segment of the working class” to the benefit of the Japanese majority and to the
detriment of the ethnic Korean minority. 8
B. Japanese Imperialism in Korea – Post-decolonization Migration
The official Japanese annexation of Korea ended in 1945, corresponding with the defeat
of Japan in World War II. During the Allied occupation of Japan immediately following WWII,
the occupied government focused primarily on demilitarization, economic reform, and
democratization. While there were centers of repatriation for Japanese soldiers returning to Japan
and former colonized populations leaving for their home country, the occupied government had
no Zainichi Korean policy beyond this. 9 With a population of over two million ethnic Koreans
living in Japan who were largely involved in the economic and military activities of the country,
the question of whether to remain or return was thus posed to the individual ethnic Korean
migrants themselves.
Many of these migrants chose to repatriate back to their ancestral homeland. Over one
million returned to either North or South Korea, leaving a population of approximately 464,000
ethnic Koreans residing in Japan by 1950. 10 Those who chose to remain did so for varying
reasons, some positive, and others out of necessity. There were those who found success in

Weiner and Chapman, “Zainichi Koreans in history and memory,” 163.
Ibid.
9
Taegi Kim, Sengo Nihon Seiji to Zainichi Chōsenjin Mondai. SCAP no Taizainichi Chōsenjin
Seisaku, 1945-1952 (Postwar Japanese Politics and the Zainichi Chosenjin Problem: SCAP
Policies towards Zainichi Chosenjin, 1945- 1952) (Tokyo: Keisō shobo, 1997).
10
Tamura, “The Status and Role of Ethnic Koreans in the Japanese Economy,” 83.
7
8
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Japan, or were already familiar with Japanese culture and language, while there were those who
remained out of fear of the political uncertainty of a post-colonial Korea, or were forced to
remain due to the inability to afford a return journey. 11
These remaining ethnic Korean migrants became known as Zainichi Koreans, a term I
will continue to use throughout this paper. Although the literal translation of Zainichi is “staying
in Japan temporarily,” many of these Zainichi Koreans have since remained in Japan, as either
permanent residents or Japanese nationals through the naturalization process. 12 As the term was
coined directly following World War II and the decolonization of Korea, the sentiment behind it
likely reflected the desire for these remaining Korean migrants and their descendants to return to
the Korean peninsula one day.
Interestingly, however, the current population of Zainichi Koreans and their subsequent
generations has remained around 600,000, and thus it seems as though this inclination to
repatriate has faded. 13 However, the consistent use of the term by both wider Japanese society
and Zainichi Koreans themselves simultaneously reflects a continual association with a longing
desire to return to their ancestral homeland and the stagnant positioning of ethnic Koreans as
temporary or ‘other.’

11

Rennie Moon, SPICE (Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education),
“Koreans in Japan” in SPICE Digest (Stanford, CA: Freeman Spogli Institute for International
Studies, Fall 2010), 1.
12
Kazuko Suzuki, “Divided Fates: The State, Race, and Adaptation of Korean Immigrants in
Japan and the United States,” (Unpublished, 2009), 7.
13
Suzuki, “Divided Fates: The State, Race, and Adaptation of Korean Immigrants in Japan and
the United States,” 7.
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C. British Imperialism in India – Colonial Migration
While the reach of Japanese imperialism was largely limited to neighboring territories in
Eastern Asia, the United Kingdom, at the height of its empire, had colonial holdings in multiple
countries on multiple continents. One of the major territories under imperial British rule was the
Indian subcontinent, which was under Crown rule between 1858 and 1947. The British saw their
expanding empire primarily in economic terms. In fact, British imperialism in India began with
the British-run East India Company (EIC), a trading company originally pursuing trade in East
and Southeast Asia, extending its economic monopoly on trade to wider political control of the
subcontinent between 1757-1858. 14
According to British Pakistani scholar Dilip Hiro, “Britain’s overriding concern remained
economic—first, trade and then, with rapid industrialization at home, adequate supplies of raw
materials for British factories, and guaranteed colonial markets for her manufactured goods.” 15
Thus, when the British government assumed direct control over India from the EIC in 1858, the
government continued to see the Indian subcontinent predominantly as another opportunity to
extend their economic interests.
This interest in India was furthered by the abolition of slavery in the UK, with exceptions
in 1833 and unconditionally in 1843. The emancipation of African slaves severely fractured the
various plantation-based economies which had previously relied on slave labor. 16 Thus, they
turned to India as their newest source of labor, presenting monetary incentives and false
promises to entice Indians to migrate to various British colonies including Mauritius, British
The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, “East India Company” in the Encyclopedia
Britannica, (17 July 2017).
15
Dilip Hiro, “The Coolies of the Empire and Britain” in Black British, White British
(Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1973), 99.
16
Hiro, Black British, White British, 100.
14
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Guiana, Trinidad, Jamaica, Ceylon, Malaya, Burma, and later South Africa and parts of East
Africa. 17
These laborers were attracted by the inaccurate and misleading vision of these foreign
territories as luxurious, put forth by Indian agents hired by the East India Company guaranteeing
free land and “free passage to a ‘land of milk and honey’ and back, if the actual situation turned
out to be less rosy.” 18 These promises were false and not written directly into the contracts
provided, and thus the illiterate laborers unknowingly signed themselves up for a semi-enslaved
version of a feudal-like system (later referred to as indentured labor). 19
At the same time, and falling in line with larger imperial patterns of economic-based
migration policies, Indians were also being recruited by the EIC to replace the white sailors who
landed in India, and as a result began settlement in Britain. 20 Further migration due to study,
political activism, military recruitment, and business opportunities led to at least 40,000 Indians
in the UK by the 1850s. 21 However, with a general population of well over 25 million in the UK
by this time, this nineteenth century population of Indians in Britain was not statistically
significant.
Interwar migration numbers followed this wider statistically insignificant pattern—slowly
increasing both the number of working-class and professional Indians in Britain, who began to

17

Hiro, Black British, White British, 100-101.
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
British Library, “Asians in Britain: brief outline (1600-1947),” British Library Asians in
Britain, 2017.
21
Michael Fisher, “Excluding and Including ‘Natives of India’: Early-Nineteenth-Century
British-Indian Race Relations in Britain" in Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the
Middle East, 27 (2), 2007, 304-305.
18
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create organizations and institutions based on the aggregation of Indian culture. 22 In fact,
although larger post-WWII migration patterns from other colonial holdings to Britain began to
occur immediately following the war, it was not until 1960 that a large-scale population of
Indians migrated to the UK.
D. British Imperialism in India – Post-decolonization Migration
The end of World War II, with its economic strain and the rise of anti-colonial
independence movements, marked the beginning of the end of the wider British empire. For the
British Raj, this end came in 1947 when the government signed the Indian Independence Act
partitioning the Indian subcontinent into independent India and Pakistan. Following this, heavy
migration patterns did not occur between India, the former colony, and the UK, its imperial
counterpart. Rather there was substantial migration between newly-partitioned India and
Pakistan, largely based on religious affiliation, with Muslims migrating into Pakistani territory
and Sikhs and Hindus into Indian territory. 23 Displacement due to violence in the disputed
territory of the Kashmir region, which has been claimed by India and Pakistan since the partition,
also contributed to high numbers of migration within the subcontinent. 24.
The British Nationality Act of 1948, which granted British citizenship to members of the
Commonwealth and remaining British colonies, extended the right to migrate to the UK to all
British subjects. 25 However, Indian migration to the UK continued to be seen in economic terms

British Library, “Asians in Britain: brief outline (1600-1947)”
Hiro, Black British, White British, 104.
24
The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, “Kashmir” in the Encyclopedia Britannica, (30
November 2017).
25
Stephen Castles, “Indians in Britain,” IMDS Working Paper Series, (Oxford, UK, 2009), 23.
Kathleen Paul, “Subjects and Citizens” in Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the
Postwar Era (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 12.
22
23
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and occurred significantly less than intra-Indian subcontinent migration. Of the low volume of
Indian migrants to Britain prior to the 1960 boom, many were single male laborers who moved
for short-term economic opportunity and did not intend to permanently reside in the UK. 26
These low numbers of Indian migrants post-decolonization can also be linked to
restrictions put in place by the British government to curb labor migration from Commonwealth
countries in the wake of both economic stagnation within the UK and the occurrence of violent
race riots in the late 1950s. 27 This was simultaneously supplemented by restrictions from the
Indian government itself, which in 1954, denied its state governments the ability to issue
passports to its citizens and later imposed rigid educational and financial prerequisites for
applications. 28 Thus, even with decolonization, very little changed in the way of migration
patterns. Both the British government’s restrictions and the Indians’ lack of desire to migrate
outside of economic reasons contributed to maintaining Indian migration at a minimum from
1947 to 1960.
Following a court ruling by the Supreme Court of India in 1960 which declared it
unconstitutional to restrict freedom of travel, the number of Indian migrants to the UK rose from
31,000 in 1951 to 81,000 in 1961. 29 The subsequent year, the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of
1962 was enacted, following the British government’s desire to restrict migration from former
colonies, limiting the amount of purely labor-based workers. However, as the act still permitted
immigration of individuals and families with sponsors or contacts in the UK, this changed the
trajectory of Indian migration to Britain.

Castles, “Indians in Britain,” 24.
Ibid.
28
Hiro, Black British, White British, 107.
29
Castles, “Indians in Britain,” 25.
26
27
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What began as a system of temporary relocation due to economic opportunity was
replaced with a pattern of more permanent resettlement in the UK. 30 Interestingly, while the
British government’s initial goal was to reduce what they saw as an influx of uneducated,
illiterate ‘colored immigrants’ from East and South Africa, they instead inadvertently replaced
their desired demographic. The British rid their country of temporary Indian migrants of
primarily professional and academic backgrounds, who possessed an understanding of English
and the UK system, with those from an agricultural background and little to no familiarity with
the language or the country’s culture in which they would now be creating a permanent home. 31
The 1970s and 1980s saw another decline in general Commonwealth migration, including
Indian migration. However, by then these previously migrated populations had settled in the UK
and built both families and communities within Britain. 32 The 1990s saw a rise in medical
professionals and students “as part of the global trend to mobility of highly-skilled personnel…
[and] increasing prosperity in India and the search for educational credentials from highlyregarded universities.” 33 Thus, the waves of British Indian migration were influenced by
multiple factors: domestic constraints, wider UK immigration policy, and global trends.
Today, British Indians make up the largest minority ethnic group and second largest
ethnic group overall with a population of 1.4 million recorded in the last census on ethnicity and
national identity in the UK. 34 While these numbers do not include religious affiliation, a separate

Castles, “Indians in Britain,” 24.
Hiro, Black British, White British, 109.
32
Castles, “Indians in Britain,” 25.
33
Ibid.
34
Office for National Statistics, “Ethnicity and National Identity in England and Wales: 2011”
(2012).
Note - This has grown an additional 0.5% from the previous UK national census in 2001,
suggesting either or both continual migration and rising birth rates.
30
31

Sekijima 15

census on religion in the UK recorded 1.5% of the overall population as Hindu. 35 With 2.5% of
the British population identifying as ethnically Indian of which the majority is Hindu, British
Hindu Indians currently occupy a position of the majority among the various ethnic and religious
minorities within the UK.

Theoretical Framework
This paper, in examining post-decolonization practices and ethnocultural identification, is
in conversation with various concepts including acculturation and transnationalism. To
understand the existing relationship between government policies, individual identity politics,
and the role each plays within this thesis, it is necessary to define these terms.
I chose to use the term acculturation, rather than more familiar terms such as assimilation
and cultural adaptation, as I see it as the most appropriate for the context. Assimilation often
implies that one minority group is changing in response to a larger majority, providing a context
in which the majority is at the top. Acculturation, on the other hand, is framed more in a neutral
context, in which “groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous firsthand contact with subsequent changes in the original culture patterns of either or both groups.” 36
The use of acculturation, then, provides a framework in which cultures are in communication
with one another and are not necessarily dominated by the majority culture. This is important as

Office for National Statistics, “Religion in England and Wales: 2011” (2012).
Robert Redfield, Ralph Linton, and Melville Herskovits, “Memorandum for the Study of
Acculturation,” in American Anthropologist 38, no. 1 (1936): 149-152, quoted in John Berry,
“Immigration, Acculturation, and Adaptation” in Applied Psychology: An International Review
46, no. 1 (1997), 7.
35
36
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it provides emphasis on the real, lived experience of the minority rather than simply framing
changes from a top-down structure.
The concept of acculturation can be further broken down into its various strategies using
existing scholarship provided by acculturation psychologist John Berry. For Berry, four distinct
strategies exist based on the varying levels of importance placed on maintenance of personal
identity and wider societal relationships – assimilation, separation, integration, and
marginalization. While he uses the terms ‘dominant’ and ‘non-dominant,” in the context of this
paper, they can be seen to mean the former ruling cultures, the United Kingdom and Japan, and
the former colonized, migrant cultures, British Hindu Indians and Zainichi Koreans.
Through the point of view of the minority groups, assimilation occurs “when individuals
do not wish to maintain their cultural identity and seek daily interaction with other cultures.” 37
Separation, on the other hand, occurs “when individuals place a value on holding onto their
original culture, and at the same time wish to avoid interaction with others.” 38 While
assimilation and separation are on one side of the spectrum, differing both in the value they place
on individual cultural identity and level of interaction with others, integration and
marginalization are on the other side, occupying an all-or-nothing framework.
Integration occurs “when there is an interest in both maintaining one’s original culture
while in daily interactions with other groups… where there is some degree of cultural integrity
maintained, while at the same time seeking to participate as an integral part of the larger social
network.” 39 Thus, for those choosing an integration approach, there is a balance between valuing

John Berry, “Immigration, Acculturation, and Adaptation” in Applied Psychology: An
International Review 46, no. 1 (1997), 9.
38
Ibid.
39
Berry, “Immigration, Acculturation, and Adaptation,” 9.
37
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individual identity and desiring communication with others outside of that shared identity.
Opposite this is marginalization, which occurs “when there is little possibility or interest in
cultural maintenance (often for reasons of enforced cultural loss) and little interest in having
relations with others (often for reasons of exclusion or discrimination).” 40 It is useful to note the
lack of identification with both groups, as marginalization is often framed as purely exclusion
from the majority culture.
It is important to both use these terms and to keep them separate as they frame
acculturation in terms of the non-dominant, or minority population, giving them increased
agency which is often taken away from them by the dominant or majority populations. Further,
in the context of this paper, the differing strategies are helpful in recognizing the varied
approaches by which the British Hindu Indians and Zainichi Koreans sought to acculturate and
the varying strengths of their ethnocultural identities.
It is significant to note, however, the limitations to Berry’s scholarship on acculturation,
even within his distinctions. As he frames these strategies from the point of view of the minority,
there is a certain assumption that “non-dominant groups and their individual members have the
freedom to choose how they want to acculturate.” 41 However, as even Berry himself points out,
this freedom is not always available, and can be constrained by the policies of the majority. 42
While Berry suggests using different terms in such a context, I still maintain their usefulness,
particularly because my paper utilizes these terms in conversation with wider government
politics, not erasing such constraints the minority may face and of which Berry is ultimately
concerned.
Berry, “Immigration, Acculturation, and Adaptation,” 9.
Berry, “Immigration, Acculturation, and Adaptation,” 9-10.
42
Berry, “Immigration, Acculturation, and Adaptation,” 10.
40
41
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IV.

Methodology

Importance of Case Studies Chosen
In the average American classroom, the study of imperialism has been largely
Eurocentric, focusing primarily on Western expansionism throughout history and ignoring the
very similar and equally aggressive history of Japanese expansion. This lack of attention given to
Japanese imperialism, combined with the lasting right-wing propagandizing and re-writing of
WWII history in modern Japanese textbooks, has left a gap in the awareness of Zainichi Koreans
and their unique experiences. Further, as one of the most ethnically homogenous countries in the
world, the Japanese government has a longstanding history of placing a high level of importance
on its own self-proclaimed monoethnicity, ignoring the reality of the existence of other minority
ethnic groups. 43
Contrary to the inattention given to Japanese imperialism, the history of the British
empire is widely discussed, with the UK’s current state of multiculturalism being analyzed both
in academia and at the state level. The abundance of minority ethnic groups, particularly the
visibility of the British Indian community in all aspects of life—social, political, and economic,
suggests a very different public perception and representation of British Hindu Indians in the
UK, in comparison to Zainichi Koreans in Japan.
Thus, for this paper I specifically chose to focus on Hindu Indians in the UK and Zainichi
Koreans in Japan because despite both being formerly colonized, their current socioeconomic
situations are extremely different. British Indians compose the largest ethnic minority population
in Britain, are predominantly socioeconomically affluent, and have among the lowest poverty

Hiroshi Ono, “Race and Ethnic Relations in Contemporary Japan,” in The International
Handbook of the Demography of Race and Ethnicity (Dordrecht: Springer, 2015), 219.
43
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rates in the country. In stark contrast, not all Zainichi Koreans have been granted the rights
afforded to Japanese citizens (i.e. the right to vote, access to public establishments without
discrimination) and have among the highest unemployment rates in Japan.
Despite these vast differences, however, by virtue of both having experienced
colonization, points of similarity do exist including ongoing debates over the issue of reparations
and instances of ethnic discrimination. Further, at the time of expansion, the two were among the
most powerful industrialized states and continue to remain important players in their particular
economies. Additionally, the end of direct British rule in India and direct Japanese rule in Korea
occurred at relatively the same time (1947 and 1945, respectively) and thus they are situated in a
similar post-WWII context.
Therefore, though the context is not completely analogous, the two cases provide an
opportunity for an interesting contrasting analysis on multiple fronts—Asian/non-Western vs.
Western imperialism, ethnic homogeneity vs. multiculturalism, and winners vs. losers in World
War II.

Method
As my thesis is primarily concerned with the current societal status and economic
circumstances of British Hindu Indians and Zainichi Koreans, economic prosperity and social
acculturation are the two measures through which I believe this can best understood. Economic
prosperity is largely straightforward and will be measured through existing statistical data on
unemployment rates and median incomes. Social acculturation, on the other hand, is not as easily
measured numerically and thus calls for a more nuanced approach.
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To provide a narrative of social acculturation, I will trace the perception of identity
among the British Hindu Indians and Zainichi Koreas from immediate post-colonization to the
present. Additionally, the varied circumstances and colonial experiences between British Hindu
Indians and Zainichi Koreans calls for an analysis of the specific social issues pertaining to these
groups. For the Zainichi Korean case study I will examine the changing perceptions of
nationality acquisition while the British Hindu Indian case study will focus on their particular
role in a multicultural state.

Limitations
In any analysis of a large population, limitations exist in the extent to which such an
analysis is applicable to the entire group. This is further exacerbated when dealing with minority
populations, particularly those which were subjected (and continue to be subject) to
discriminatory policies. Although both statistical data and surveys exist and are helpful to create
a general narrative, numbers can only reveal so much. Even then, there is the possibility that
some data is hidden due to lack of participation by the community being measured. This lack of
participation can exist for a variety of reasons including lack of access and fear of backlash or
further ostracization. Regardless, it is important to keep this possibility of an incomplete
narrative of minority populations within one’s consciousness so as to not diminish the very real
and lived experiences of individual members of such communities.
Further limitations specifically pertaining to this thesis include the reliance on existing
data and statistics for analysis. While some of the most comprehensive and far-reaching data
came from government-funded surveys and data collection, I attempted to eliminate some level

Sekijima 21

of possible bias by not solely depending on such sources. Rather, by including a variety of data
sets and interviews conducted by other credible non-government affiliated organizations, this
diversity in sources can help to remove the possibility of biases of the majority and shift away
from a purely government-backed narrative.

V.

Case Study - The Zainichi Korean Experience

A. Economic Prosperity
Colonial period (1910-1945)
Throughout the period of colonization, Korean migrants to Japan served primarily in a
manual labor capacity, taking on roles which made up the lowest level of the overall Japanese
workforce. These limited options were due to multiple factors including a lack of Japanese
fluency, education, and the necessary skills, all of which were only furthered by discriminatory
hiring practices. 44 Statistics by the Fukuoka District Employment Office show that in 1928,
eighteen years after the Japanese annexation of Korea and following a 1920s surge in migration
to Japan, 91.4% of Korean migrants served as unskilled laborers. 45 On average, the wages of
these Korean unskilled laborers were 25% less than their Japanese counterparts. 46
Despite these discriminatory practices, Koreans continued to migrate to Japan in search
of work opportunities, as seen by the continual rise of Korean migration throughout the period of
colonization. For many, Japanese colonization caused significant problems in their home
country—food shortages and low economic and educational opportunity, and thus, despite the
Weiner and Chapman, “Zainichi Koreans in history and memory,” 163.
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less-than-favorable conditions, Korean workers continued to seek employment in Japan.
Although there existed a discrepancy between the wages of Japanese and Koreans in Japan, the
wages of Korean workers in Japan was on average 50% higher than those working in Korea
itself. 47 Thus, throughout the period of Korean annexation, for the average poorer, less educated
Korean, Japan was seen as the more promising prospect for economic success.

Immediate post-decolonization period (1945-early 1950s)
Unfortunately, conditions did not vastly improve immediately following the end of WWII
and decolonization. The war had completely devastated Japan and thus, for those Korean
migrants who chose to remain, the likelihood of improved economic opportunity was even less
likely than during the period of colonization. Due to the repatriation of Japanese soldiers back to
Japan and the demilitarization of Japan itself, there was an influx of 6.6 million former soldiers
into the job market, which caused job competition to rise significantly. 48
Thus, as unemployment throughout Japan was high, combined with continued hostility
against Koreans, “as long as thousands of Japanese were unemployed or under-employed, it was
not possible for Koreans to obtain jobs.” 49 In fact, Zainichi Korean unemployment rates were
14.2 times higher than the unemployment rate for the Japanese. 50 Those Zainichi Koreans who
managed to find work during this time largely participated in similar unskilled labor jobs as they
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had throughout colonization, or held simple manufacturing jobs. 51 Employment in such lowpaying jobs contributed to a high rate of poverty among Zainichi Koreans, whose average per
capita income was 2.6 times less than that of the Japanese. 52

Growth period (Late 1950s - 1970s)
Despite an immediate postwar economic decline, Japan experienced a surge of high
economic growth from the late 1950s to the end of the 1970s, through both the market and the
guiding hand of the state. 53 At the same time, the gap between the attainment of basic education
and higher education shrunk, while the divisions among high schools and colleges increased,
creating greater competition for university placement and later job opportunities. 54 Those who
tested well enough to attend the most prestigious universities were essentially guaranteed their
future careers as high-level companies often privileged an applicant’s schooling as the main
criteria for hiring.
The sudden economic growth created a demand for skilled labor and mid-level jobs,
while the emphasis on education as a principal factor in determining future job and career
options became evident to Zainichi Koreans as well. The subsequent rise in Zainichi Korean
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education attainment combined with increased employment opportunities helped to improve their
socioeconomic positions, albeit not at an analogous rate as the Japanese. 55
While the economic situation and labor demand created the possibilities for advancement,
individual, private businesses and companies continued to actively discriminate against Zainichi
Koreans, with up to 80% of surveyed companies admitting to Korean ethnicity as an important
factor in the decision to hire. 56 In the public sector, the 1953 Cabinet Legislation Bureau set
guidelines which prohibited foreign nationals, resident aliens, and noncitizens (which the
Zainichi Koreans fell under) from holding any position in a public institution including public
schools, public hospitals, and government. 57

Progress and present period (1980s – present)
Building on the changes and growth in economic status of Zainichi Koreans during the
Japanese economic boom of the 1980s and 1990s, certain industries developed primarily by
Zainichi Koreans in the postwar period such as pachinko (mechanical game) parlors and yakiniku
(grilled meat) restaurants, grew tremendously. 58 Other industries such as service and
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construction, in which Zainichi Korean representation was high, also expanded, providing
increased opportunity for employment and business. 59
Legislative change in the 1980s and 1990s allowed for Zainichi Koreans to be employed
in certain positions in the public sector, although this was more concentrated on the local level
rather than the national. 60 Additionally, in the private sector, an updated survey revealed that
over 95% of companies view nationality as not a factor in hiring decisions. 61 According to the
same survey, “of 249 companies that received applications from Koreans, about 90% actually
employed Koreans.” 62
This transformation from colonization to the present suggests an increasingly narrow gap
between economic status of Zainichi Koreans and Japanese. In fact, if you look at who occupies
the title and position of ‘director,’ Zainichi Koreans are represented at a rate almost twice as high
as ethnic Japanese. 63 While this suggests the economic success of Zainichi Koreans in attaining
high-level positions despite discrimination, it must be read in the context of postcolonialism. Due
to discriminatory hiring practices, many Zainichi Koreans were forced to start their own
businesses and practices and thus these directors are often the head of the organizations they
created rather than Japanese organizations in which they were promoted.
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Thus, despite these significant gains, the socioeconomic gap continues to exist with a
lower proportion of Zainichi Koreans serving as upper-level, high skilled employees and an
increased likelihood of temporary employment for this population. 64 Moreover, overall
unemployment rates continue to be almost twice as high for Zainichi Koreans, differing only
slightly from statistics in 1985. 65 While this examination of change over time has highlighted the
increased improvement of economic position and opportunity of Zainichi Koreans following the
end of colonization, it is clear that the socioeconomic gap and ethnic discrimination continue to
exist.

B. Social Acculturation
As one of the most homogenous countries in the world, Japan’s concept of ‘Japaneseness’ is conferred on extremely strict lines. According to sociologist Kazuko Suzuki, “the
concepts of ‘race,’ ‘ethnicity,’ and ‘nation’ are virtually indistinguishable… and the formulation
race = ethnicity = nationality = culture is essential to the Japanese conceptualization of what
makes one Japanese.” 66 Unlike the United States and its principle of jus soli which confers
American citizenship to those born on American soil, Japan follows the principle of jus
sanguinis, conferring Japanese citizenship based on parental lineage and the existence of
Japanese blood. 67
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Since the fall of the Japanese empire, “Japanese nationhood has been redefined along
exclusively ethno-genealogical lines and cultural uniformity,” so much so that “language
adoption and cultural assimilation do not qualify one as a ‘perfect’ or ‘first-class’ Japanese,
unless one has Japanese blood.” 68 The term Zainichi Korean alone signifies this othering.
Despite subsequent generations of Korean migrants being born in Japan and naturalizing,
Zainichi Koreans continue to be referred to as such, as though their stay in Japan remains
temporary.
In spite of this legal framework which relegates Zainichi Koreans into a second-class
position, the similar physical features between the two ethnicities has allowed for up to 90% of
the Zainichi Korean population to hide their ethnic background through the use of Japanese
names and the acquisition of the Japanese language. 69 On the other hand, there are those
Zainichi Koreans who oppose assimilation and through outspoken activism and a rejection of
Japanese nationality, seek to retain their traditional ethnic origins.
While Japanese nationality acquisition has become the dominant position furthered by
both the Japanese government and certain Zainichi Korean groups, tensions remain over the
memory of the colonial past which Koreans feel as though Japan has never adequately addressed.
70

These issues include crimes committed by the Imperial Japanese Army, most prominently, the

abduction and forced sexual slavery of Korean girls and women during WWII. Although a deal
between South Korea and Japan was reached in 2015, the one-billion-yen reparation funds and
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agreement to cease mutual criticism on the international stage has been argued to be insufficient
by South Korean victim groups, activists, and the current president. 71

Post-decolonization identity (1945-1970)
Following the end of WWII, both the Japanese government and the Korean migrants
themselves pushed heavily for repatriation. Less than a year after Japanese surrender, only
600,000 of the wartime population of two million were left in Japan. 72 Their status was deemed
as temporary by both perspectives, “dominated not only by exclusivist notions of Japanese
homogeneity but also by powerful and influential Korean homeland affinity and the internal
politics of the Zainichi population.” 73
Although anti-colonial Korean nationalism bound together the Zainichi Koreans
immediately following the war, the Korean War subsequently divided this population into two
prominent political groups within Japan, the Choren who represented North Korea and Mindan
who represented the South. 74 When Japan officially normalized relations with South Korea in
1965, the divisions between the Choren and Mindan were intensified. For those ethnic South
Koreans living in Japan, they were given ‘special permanent resident’ status which offered equal
access to certain welfare benefits, public education, and health services. 75 Not only did this
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divide Zainichi Koreans further into the North vs. South divide, it also divided the population
into those who supported permanent resident status and those who actively resisted it.

The ‘Third Way’ identity (1970- present)
The 1970s introduced another division within the Zainichi population when the second
and third generations began to move increasingly towards establishing their own unique identity
within the system of postcolonial Japan. 76 What emerged was the Third Way, “a hybrid stance
located in the interstices between a homogenous national Japanese identity and a closely
protected diasporic Korean national identity… [symbolizing] both liberation from being either
Korean or Japanese and an alternative and independent path that would allow for other
possibilities.” 77 While this younger generation’s fight for civil rights within Japan constituted
attempts at socioeconomic assimilation, their active use of their Korean names and refusal to
identify as Japanese signaled a more integrationist approach. 78
In the 1980s, in response to international pressure, Japan ratified the International
Covenant on Human Rights and the UN Refugee Convention, expanding the same benefits and
opportunity for special permanent resident status to all Zainichi Koreans, as opposed to simply
those who identified as South Korean. 79 This was the first step in the Japanese government’s
push into long-term and permanent integration for the Zainichi Korean population rather than the
continuation of temporary status.
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This began the process of naturalization of Zainichi Koreans which, due to the strict
citizenship laws of both South Korea and Japan which only allow for one legal nationality, only
intensified the debate over integration or resistance. As the right to vote and right to government
employment continues to be restricted to Japanese citizens (including naturalized Zainichi
Koreans), the Japanese government has simply lowered the requirements for naturalization for
these residents to obtain these privileges. 80 Rather than address the concerns of those who do not
seek to renounce their Korean identity through the acceptance of Japanese naturalization, the
Japanese government has continually encouraged naturalization as its sole solution to the
question of social acculturation in post-colonial Japan.
However, judging by the persistent resistance to this, there continues to be unsolved
tension between the desire of Zainichi Koreans for similar rights as their Japanese counterparts
and the maintenance of their unique Korean cultural and ethnic identity. As Bae Ewha, the
subject of a Japanese documentary following the lives of Zainichi Koreans explains, “[I] long for
the circumstances enjoyed by Americans, who can celebrate both their ethnic identity and their
U.S. citizenship without compromising either.” 81
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VI.

Case Study - The British Hindu Indian Experience

A. Economic Prosperity
Colonial and post-colonial period (1858- early 1960s)
During the period of Crown rule, India was largely seen as a source of labor to fill the
void left by former slaves after the abolition of such practices in the early 19th century. Tricked
into their roles by false promises, these workers served as indentured servants with extremely
low wages and lengthy contracts. 82 While some Indians were sent across the various British
colonies to participate in indentured labor practices by the East India Company, others were sent
by the same company to the UK itself, again as a replacement source of labor. 83
This population of East India Company laborers, as well as additional Indian migrants
who relocated for study and business opportunities, were primarily made up of single men who
saw their jobs as temporary and only migrated on labor grounds. 84 Immediately following the
end of WWII and despite increased rights of the former colonial subjects, there was little change
to the economic roles which Indian migrants sought. While these men would often live and work
together in groups, the concept of settling and creating an Indian community within Great Britain
was not immediately popular; instead, these migrants filled a labor shortage gap in
manufacturing and services with the intention of eventually returning home.

Migration boom period (1960s – present)
During the postwar period the UK experienced economic stagnation, leading to
government restrictions on labor-based migration which resulted in the unintended attraction of
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family settlements instead. 85 The increasing size of the community created a market for Indianowned and run businesses including grocers, tailors, restaurants, banks, and travel agencies
which significantly shifted their economic standing from labor workers to entrepreneurs. 86
Another extremely key factor in their increasing economic success was the government’s
push for mass education in the late 1960s. British Indians consistently score higher in the
General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) exams than their white British counterparts,
with 2004 data showing a 13-17 percentage gap. 87 Not only this, but 26% of British Indian
students go on to attend an elite Russell Group university, in comparison to 15% of white British
students. 88 Due to this level of higher-education attainment, British Indians are well represented
in the fields of medicine, managerial and professional jobs, and the tech sector. 89
Current employment rates paint a picture of British Indian success in levels comparable
to the white British majority. While white British employment is at 73%, British Indians are not
far behind with 71%; similarly, white British unemployment is at 6% while British Indian
unemployment sits at 7%. 90 Interestingly, however, the economic gap between British Indians
and British Pakistanis and British Bangladeshi is much higher than the gap between British
Indians and white British.
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British Pakistanis and Bangladeshis have the lowest overall employment rate at 49% and
a high rate of unemployment at 11%. 91 While 25% of the British Indian population is
impoverished, 60% of British Pakistanis live in poverty with an overrepresentation in low and
unskilled professions. 92 This significant gap between the economic success of British Indians
and British Pakistanis and Bangladeshis is intriguing and cannot be explained by a single
variable. While studies suggest that “differences in age structure, family type and family work
status together account for around half of the ‘excess’ income poverty rates suffered by minority
ethnic groups,” the other half is not accounted for and thus the exploration of the social
acculturation of British Hindu Indians can help shed light onto the situational differences which
has driven this division. 93

B. Social Acculturation
In response to race riots and conflicts in the 1950s, the government took action through a
policy of state multiculturalism, putting forth anti-discrimination legislation and integration
programs on the national and local level. 94 Such legislation included measures to prevent
discrimination in hiring decisions and public establishments and the development of a
‘multicultural’ education. 95
Individually among British migrants from South Asia, there seems to be a discrepancy
between the varying identities and the ways in which they have chosen to acculturate to the
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British culture. While the majority of young ethnic minorities in the UK “are learning to be
bicultural and bilingual and are developing hyphenated identities,” those with South Asian
backgrounds have approached acculturation with a wider spectrum of responses. 96
According to Paul Ghuman, British Hindu Indians are more likely to develop an
assimilation strategy while British Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are more likely to emphasize
their Muslim identity and develop an accommodation strategy. 97 This finding is supported by
another study focusing on British South Asian adolescents in which the researchers found that
the majority of British Indians sought integration while British Pakistanis sought separation
despite both groups signaling that ethnic identity is more important than national identity. 98
Both British Indians and British Pakistanis live in communities with a prominent level of
ethnic uniformity, owing to the patterns of migration during and immediately following the
period of colonization. This aggregation of persons of the same ethnic background has continued
despite increased overall diversity in the UK and increased mobility; “63% of Indians [and 76%
of Pakistanis] would need to move to another neighborhood within England in order for there to
be no segregation between them and all other ethnic groups.” 99
This choice of neighborhood is also important from both the social acculturation and
economic standpoints. There is a large concentration of British Pakistanis in Northern England,
where there are fewer opportunities and demand for higher-skilled labor while British Indians are
scattered throughout the UK. 100 Combined with the higher level of educational attainment and
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GDP per capita in India, the starting point from which Hindu Indian migrants began was a much
more advantaged position than the less wealthy, less educated Pakistanis migrants. 101
Religion also plays a significant role in cultural acculturation and economic success. As
the majority of British Pakistanis are Muslim, and studies show they are more likely to identity
with and emphasize their Muslim identity, their acculturation strategy tends to lean more heavily
on the accommodation side rather than assimilation. 102 In regard to economic opportunity, not
only are Muslims often subject to discrimination based on religious belief, they also are more
likely to actively search for jobs that are accommodating of Muslim practices and thus the
number of overall employment opportunities for this population shrink further. 103 Consequently,
as a majority of British Indians identify as Hindu, this restriction exists on a lesser extent and has
given rise to a wider variety of opportunities for economic and acculturation success.

VII.

Analysis

Due to the nature of colonialism and the varying factors in conversation with one another,
it is difficult to pinpoint one particular factor which has influenced the current socioeconomic
status of Zainichi Koreans and British Hindu Indians. For both these groups, however, it is clear
that education, job demand, and government policy has significantly changed their positions in
society both negatively and positively.
The rise in higher education attainment for both Zainichi Koreans and British Hindu
Indians have provided increased opportunity in various fields. The variation in labor demand
following decolonization and the end of WWII has increased the presence of these minorities
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during higher need and increased restrictions against these minorities during lower need. These
factors have been further influenced by government policy which has responded to these
changing factors, needs, and realities accordingly.
Why then have British Hindu Indians been able to become such a ‘successful’ minority
within the UK while Zainichi Koreans continue to be identified as second-class citizens?
Through an analysis of the case studies outlining the development in economic prosperity and
cultural acculturation, I suggest that success and failure is dependent on two factors: first, the
wider government strategy in regards to former colonized populations and second, the existence
of other minorities. These two factors are mutually dependent as the existence of multiple
minorities, and thus the existence of a multicultural state, plays into the wider government
strategy of acculturation.
Although Japanese imperialism reached Taiwan and parts of China, Korea was an official
territorial acquisition of the Japanese empire and had the highest level of migration into Japan
during the period of colonialization. Because the expansion of Japanese rule only reached within
parts of East Asia, the existence of other minorities such as Chinese migrants was not significant
enough for Japan to become a multiethnic, melting-pot state. Despite having similar physical
features and shared cultural elements, the Japanese history of the occupation of Korea continued
the delegation of a lesser-than position to this population even after decolonization. Because
there existed no other significant minority at the time, the government did little to address the
issues of the Zainichi Korean population. Although it was the largest ethnic minority living in
Japan, it was a much too insignificant number in regard to the overall Japanese population for the
Japanese to consider a priority.

Sekijima 37

On the other hand, British colonialism was far-reaching, and had acquired territory in
various continents. Thus, in the case of the British Hindu Indians, the existence of other former
colonial populations in the UK and the tensions it created called for the government to take up a
strategy of legislated multiculturalism, which can be seen through the 1965 Race Relations Act
and the subsequent amended iterations, each building upon the last to widen its protections. This
multiculturalism also unintentionally created a system by which British Hindu Indians were able
to rise to the top through the othering of ethnicities outside of itself.
Drawing on the concept of the model minority in the United States, I suggest that in the
same manner by which Asian immigrants to the US were able to seemingly achieve
socioeconomic success through the conscious and unconscious othering of other minorities as a
threat or as negative (leading to the societal creation of hierarchies among minorities), Indian
migrants to the UK had a similar experience, especially as seen through the race riots of the
1950s which specifically targeted black British communities. 104 Additionally, both Asian
Americans and British Hindu Indians have achieved a high level of educational attainment and
higher median incomes in relation to other minorities in the US and UK respectively. Despite
this model minority framework, however, this does not diminish the real racism and issues which
British Hindu Indians face. Rather, it renders these problems invisible under the illusion of
economic prosperity and success in acculturation of the former imperial state.
Interestingly, both minority populations of Zainichi Koreans and British Hindu Indians
are rendered invisible in separate ways. Those who are ethnically Korean are often forced or
pressured to hide their Korean identity in favor for Japanese assimilation, erasing their struggles
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and lack of full rights under a Japanese name. British Hindu Indians, who are lauded as having
successfully achieved acculturation and economic prosperity, often live with their particular
problems rendered unnoticed or unaddressed in the face of other more visible ones, such as the
current rise in xenophobia against the British Muslim community. 105

VIII. Conclusion
Despite over seventy years passing since the end of colonialism on the Korean peninsula
and Indian subcontinent, the consequences and legacies of Japanese and British imperialism
continue to affect those who have migrated to their former ruling state as well as their subsequent
generations. Interestingly, despite sharing the same colonial framework, Zainichi Koreans and
British Hindu Indians maintain a varied position in their respective societies. I posit that this is
due to the government’s strategy in addressing these populations and responding to the particular
societal issues they face including racism and discriminatory practices.
While the British government took concrete steps to address racism as a multicultural
state beginning in the 1960s, the Japanese government took an additional twenty years to even
officially recognize the Zainichi Korean population’s existence. The existence of multiple former
colonial populations in the UK created a large population of migrants and non-white residents
which necessitated an active government role in addressing the tensions which took place
following the fall of the greater British empire. In contrast, Zainichi Koreans did, and continue to
make up less than 1% of the overall Japanese population and through the acquisition of a
Japanese name and fluency, can easily be rendered invisible. Thus, a dichotomy of vocal and
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invisible Zainichi Koreans exists, allowing the government to essentially ignore or inadequately
address the particular issues Zainichi Koreans face.
While this does not account for the varied experiences members of these populations face
individually, this analysis is helpful in understanding why British Hindu Indians are rendered a
‘successful’ minority in the UK while Zainichi Koreans have yet to achieve the same level of
socioeconomic prosperity. Further research into the divisions among these populations—
particularly the difference among those ethnic Koreans who chose to assimilate and assume a
Japanese identity versus those who continue to maintain their Korean identity and the varied
experience of British Indians by religion and faith—would allow for a more complete
understanding of how culture, race, and identity remain in conversation with the wider legacies
of colonialism.
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